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Abstract
This paper analyzes behavior on a TV game show where players’
monetary payoﬀs depend upon an array of factors, including ability in
answering questions, perceived cooperativeness and the willingness of
other players to choose them. We find a substantial beauty premium
and are able to disentangle contributing factors. Attractive players
perform no diﬀerently than less attractive ones, on every dimension.
They also exhibit and engender the same degree of cooperativeness.
Nevertheless, attractive players are substantially less likely to be elim-
inated by their peers. Our results suggest a consumption value basis
for the beauty premium.
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1 Introduction
In a surprising and influential paper, Hamermesh and Biddle (1994) found
a substantial beauty premium in the labor market, of the order of 15%.
There are several competing explanations for this premium. Attractiveness
may be correlated with other unobservable productive attributes such as
health, education or other types of human capital. Attractive people may
be more confident, thus enhancing their social skills in the workplace.1 There
may also be an element of reverse causality — individuals who fare well in
the labor market may have both the ability and incentive (via greater self
esteem) in investing in looking good.2 Perhaps the simplest explanation is
that attractiveness has a "consumption-value", either to the customers of
the firm, fellow employees, or the boss. The beauty premium in this case
is a form of taste-based discrimination, and as Becker (1957) pointed out,
discriminators must be willing to pay a price. While anecdotal evidence
on the importance of consumption value considerations in the hiring of air
hostesses or waitresses certainly exists, the question remains whether this is
a more generalized phenomenon.
This paper analyzes participant behavior on a television game show in
order to disentangle these components of the beauty premium.3 Specifically,
we can ask: are attractive people more productive? Are they more coopera-
tive or do they engender cooperation? Are they more likely to be chosen by
their peers when a selection decision has to be made? We are able to answer
these questions since the game show has a rich structure, with participants
being involved in a number of diﬀerent tasks and decisions. It takes place
over three rounds, in which players accumulate "earnings" by answering quiz
1See Mobius and Rosenblat (2006) for experimental evidence for this hypothesis.
2Reverse causality is to some extent addressed in Biddle and Hamermesh (1998), since
they use attractiveness as measured by photographs taken at law school as the explanatory
variable. It is also not a problem in experimental or quasi-experimental studies provided
one controls for income.
3List (2006) and Levitt (2004) also use gameshows to study discrimination on other
dimensions (such as race, gender, and age).
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questions, and their earnings depend on the accuracy of their answers, on
how quickly they press the buzzer and also on their "investment decisions".
Earnings therefore depend upon ability as well as a player’s confidence. This
allows us to study the eﬀect of attractiveness as well as other player char-
acteristics — most notably gender — upon performance. At the end of each
round, the lead player — the one with the highest earnings — decides which
one of the remaining players to eliminate. This allows us to study the role
of attractiveness and gender (in addition to performance) upon the selection
decision. After the final round, when only two players remain, they play a
prisoner’s dilemma game, allowing us to study the role of beauty on cooper-
ation. The median stake in this prisoner’s dilemma game is C=1,683, so that
the monetary consequences of players’ decisions are substantial.
Our key findings are as follows. Overall, there is a substantial beauty
premium, with attractive people earning C=300 more than unattractive ones.
This premium cannot be attributed to any aspect of performance — attractive
people fare no diﬀerently from unattractive ones in answering questions or in
investment behavior. They are no more likely to cooperate in the final stage,
and opponents also behave no diﬀerently vis-a-vis them. Nevertheless, when
one person has to be eliminated by the lead player in any round, an attractive
player is significantly less likely to be chosen than a less attractive one. These
results support a "consumption value" basis for the beauty premium in our
context. Indeed, discriminating in favor of attractive players is costly to
the lead player, implying an adverse selection in terms of earning potential.
These costs are significant; a back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that
the losses amount to C=350 on average.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes
the game show and our construction of the measure of attractiveness. Sec-
tion 3 analyzes behavior on the game show, in terms of performance and
cooperation. Section 4 studies the selection decisions by lead players and
establishes that attractive players benefit in this context. The final section
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reviews the related literature and concludes.
2 Description of the data
2.1 The game show
We use data from all 69 episodes of the game show Shafted, broadcast in
the Netherlands in 2002. The game starts with five players, who accumulate
earnings by answering quiz questions. At the end of each of four rounds, the
player with the highest earnings in that round — the lead player henceforth
— must choose one of the remaining players for elimination. An eliminated
player has no further role in the game and loses all of his or her earnings.
At the end of three rounds, the two remaining players play a prisoner’s
dilemma game. Let E denote the total prize money, which equals the sum
of earnings of the two finalists. The finalists simultaneously decide whether
to share (S) or to grab (G). The monetary payoﬀs are depicted in Table
1. These monetary payoﬀs correspond to generalized prisoner’s dilemma,
where G is a weakly dominant strategy.4
S G
S 12E,
1
2E 0, E
G E, 0 0, 0
Table 1: Monetary payoﬀs
Players earn money by answering questions in each round as follows. At
the beginning of each round a player must decide how much of his capital to
"invest" in answering each question. Only the player who first presses the
4Players share 43 percent of of the time, suggesting that non-monetary motivations
are important. A detailed analysis of behavior in the prisoner’s dilemma stage and its
consistency with models of social preferences can be found in Belot et al. (2006). The
prisoner’s dilemma stage is similar to that in the game show Friend or Foe (see List
(2004, 2006), Kalist (2005) and Oberholzer-Gee et al. (2004)); however, the overall game
is diﬀerent.
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buzzer gets to answer the question. A correct answer yields yi, his chosen
level of investment, while an incorrect answer earns −yi. A player who loses
his entire capital may not answer any further questions. Each round ends
with a bonus question, for which players choose new investments. The player
with the highest investment must answer the bonus question, again gaining
or losing the investment. The player with the highest score at the end of
the round chooses one of the remaining players for elimination. Play then
proceeds to the next round, where the initial capital for all players equals
the earnings of the lead player in the previous round.5
2.2 Measure of beauty
We construct a measure of beauty based on independent ratings. Each of
the 345 participants in the game show was rated on a scale from 1 (very
unattractive) to 7 (very attractive) by approximately 10 raters (5 males and
5 females). Raters were recruited in public spaces to obtain a representative
sample of the adult population. Raters were on average 31.7 years old,
which is close to the average age of 33 years among participants on the
game show. In total 120 raters were recruited, and each rater rated 30
participants. This was based on watching short silent video fragments of
the game show in which a candidate introduced herself. We ensured that
all five participants on any show were rated by the same set of raters, while
varying the order in which the shows were presented.
Our simple measure of attractiveness is the average of ratings (averaged
across raters) for each candidate.6 There is a high degree of concurrence on
5A player’s capital in the first round is determined as follows. Six prospective partici-
pants simultaneously choose a number between 1 and 100. The player choosing the highest
number is eliminated, and the remaining players have an initial capital equal to their cho-
sen number. The format of this preliminary elimination stage was slightly diﬀerent in the
first few episodes.
6Raters may have diﬀerent perceptions on the average beauty. To correct for such
diﬀerences, some other studies use standardized measures. Each rating is adjusted for the
mean rating of that rater, and is then normalized by dividing by the standard error (see
e.g. Mobius and Rosenblat, 2006). We chose to have many diﬀerent raters rating diﬀerent
subjects. The means are not comparable among raters, because the sample of episodes
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attractiveness across raters, as measured by Cronbach’s alpha for all sub-
samples of judges who rated the same sample of participants. The Cron-
bach’s alpha ranged from 0.70 to 0.85, showing high agreement. Table 2
reports some summary statistics of the ratings. Contrary to what one might
expect, the average participant is rated slightly below the population av-
erage of 4 (the mean of all ratings is equal to 3.51). Beauty is negatively
correlated with age and women are on average rated as being more attrac-
tive than men. Average ratings are also more variable across women than
men.
Table 2: Attractiveness - Summary statistics
Mean (st. dev.) Min Max
All (N = 345) 3.51 (.69) 1.7 5.75
Men (N = 225) 3.45 (.63) 2.0 5.20
Women (N = 120) 3.62 (.79) 1.7 5.75
Age ≥ 34 (N = 177) 3.30 (.60) 1.7 4.80
Age < 34 (N = 176) 3.71 (.71) 2.2 5.75
3 Decomposing the beauty premium
Consistent with earlier research, we find evidence of a sizeable beauty pre-
mium. Players with an attractiveness level one standard deviation above
the mean earn roughly C=300 more than those whose attractiveness is one
standard deviation below the mean.7 Given the many determinants of pay-
oﬀs in the show, this premium could be attributable to a variety of factors.
We now study each of these factors in turn.
they rated were partly diﬀerent. We therefore prefer to use the raw data. However, if we
standardize ratings for the subsamples of ratings made for the same players, we find the
same results.
7This earnings gap translates into a 100 percent premium for the attractive players
compared to unattractive players. However, this high percentage is largely due to the
asymmetry in earnings in this game: those who are eliminated have zero earnings.
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3.1 Beauty and performance
We first investigate the relationship between beauty and performance in an-
swering quiz questions. The total earnings of a player in a round is probably
the most important measure of overall performance. The player with the
highest earnings becomes the lead player for that round, making the elimi-
nation decision. In the first two rounds the lead player’s earnings determine
the initial capital for all remaining players in the next round. In the third
round, a player’s earnings are added to the total stake, if he is either the
lead player or not eliminated by the lead player.
Since players compete to answer each question, their performance in
the game is a relative measure. If there is a relation between beauty and
performance then this will depend on the composition of players within an
episode. Hence, we cannot draw conclusions from simple cross-correlations
over episodes. But if attractive people have a better overall ability, shows
with more attractive participants should be associated with a better per-
formance overall. Figure 1 plots the total number of questions answered
correctly in the first round against the average attractiveness of participants
in the show. We find no correlation between the two. Less attractive pop-
ulations of players perform equally well as more attractive populations of
players.
Two player positions, the first and the last, are of particular interest.
The player who is ranked first in terms of earnings must choose one of the
others for elimination, and cannot be eliminated himself in that round. The
last ranked player is an obvious candidate for elimination. We estimate a
conditional logit model for the probability of being in the first or last position
conditional on participating in the same episode. The conditional logit is a
natural framework for modelling choices from a set of alternatives. In our
context, the alternatives are the players in the round, and each player has a
vector of attributes Xj (gender, age, attractiveness). The conditional logit
6
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Figure 1: Mean beauty rate of players per episode and average number of
correct answers.
model has the form:
p(yj = 1) =
exp(β0Xj)P
j exp(β
0Xj)
for j = 1, ...5,
where yj is a dichotomous variable indicating whether the player is in first
(resp. last) position or not (yj = {1, 0}). One important assumption for the
validity of the conditional logit estimates is the assumption of independence
of irrelevant alternatives. In the appendix, we discuss this assumption and
test for its validity. We found that the modelling assumptions were not
rejected.
Table 3 reports the results. Columns 1 and 2 show the odds ratios of
ending up in the first or last position. Note that the reference value is
one, i.e. if the odds ratio is 1, this means that the attribute is irrelevant
in determining a player’s relative position. An odds ratio below (above)
1 means that the attribute decreases (increases) the probability of ending
up in a particular position. None of the coeﬃcients is significantly diﬀerent
from 1, so the likelihood of ending up first or last does not depend on gender,
age, or attractiveness.
To investigate further the correlation between the players’ attributes and
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their rank in terms of earnings, we estimate a rank-ordered logit model that
explicitly takes account of the ranking of players within a game and specifies
this ranking as a function of their relative attributes. The rank-ordered
logit specification is a refinement of the conditional logit specification, using
information not only on which alternative is "best", but also on the ranking
of these alternatives. The results are reported in the third column of Table
3. We find no clear correlation between any of these characteristics and score
ranking. In particular, there is no evidence that attractive people rank any
diﬀerent from unattractive ones.
Table 3 - Earnings ranking in first round and individual characteristics
First position Last position Earnings ranking
Odds ratios Odds ratios
Mean attractiveness 1.16 (.26) 1.33 (.29) -.08 (.12)
Female .79 (.21) .93 (.24) -.06 (.14)
Age 1.00 (.02) 1.01 (.02) -.01 (.01)
N. obs. 345 345 345
Model Cond. logit Cond. logit Rank-ordered logit
3.2 Decomposing the performance measure
Even if the overall performance of players is uncorrelated with attractiveness,
it could be that players diﬀer in how they accumulate earnings. Recall
that the earnings in the game depend on the initial capital, the share of
capital invested, and the performance in answering questions. Mobius et.
al. (2006) find that more attractive people are more confident and appear
more productive to others (although they are not). In this context, we would
expect highly confident players to be more active in the game in terms of
investment and answering questions.
We study the behavior of players in each round, both in regular questions
(where the answering decision is taken after players see the question) and in
the bonus questions (where the answering decision is linked to the investment
decision and is taken before players see the question).
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3.2.1 Behavior in the regular questions
Let us now consider how the decision to answer depends upon a player’s
ability, confidence, and risk aversion. Recall that by being the first to press
the buzzer, player i faces a lottery where he gets yi (his chosen investment
level) if he is correct, and gets −yi if incorrect. Let pi be the subjective
probability assigned by i to his answer being correct.8 Let xi be his current
score, and let Vi(.) denote his expected continuation value in the game after
this question. It is optimal for player i to answer to the question if:
piVi(xi + yi) + (1− pi)Vi(xi − yi) ≥ Vi(xi).
That is, i will answer the question if pi exceeds a critical threshold:
pi ≥
Vi(xi)− Vi(xi − yi)
Vi(xi + yi)− Vi(xi − yi)
≡ p¯i,
where p¯i ∈ (0, 1) as long as Vi is strictly increasing. Notice that the
threshold value, p¯i, is larger if the player is more risk averse, i.e. if Vi(.)
is more concave. Since we observe the frequency of correct answers for
every player, we have an estimate of qi, the objective probability that a
player is correct conditional on answering. That is we have an estimate of
E(qi|pi ≥ p¯i). A player who is more risk averse will have a higher threshold
value p¯i, and will therefore answer fewer questions but be observed to answer
a greater proportion of questions correctly. On the other hand, a player who
is more confident — i.e. has a greater value of pi for a given qi — will answer
more questions and will make more mistakes in his answers. In other words,
risk aversion and lower confidence act in very much the same way, in reducing
both the number of answers and also the proportion of incorrect answers.
On the other hand, if a player is less knowledgeable, and objectively has a
8As the player thinks about the question, his subjective probability will evolve over
time. The analysis that follows pertains to any instant of time, so the continuation value
from not pressing the button (Vi(xi)) includes the option value of waiting, and possibly
pressing the buzzer in the future, if no one else presses in interim.
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lower value of qi, this will ceteris paribus reduce the number of answers but
not raise the proportion of correct answers.
Table 4 - Initial capital and share invested in each round of the game
OLS estimates
Initial capital Share invested
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Round 1 Round 2 Round 3
attractiveness .609 (.805) -.032 (.020) -.024 (.028) .009 (.034)
female -.138 (1.089) -.011 (.025) -.041 (.032) -.058 (.038)
age .096 (.061) -.004 (.002)*** -.009 (.002)*** -.006 (.002)**
constant 43.05 (4.70)*** .940 (.096)*** .993 (.132) .845 (.165)
adjusted R2 .32 .025 .059 .044
N. obs. 345 345 276 207
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by episode.
Significance levels: *: 10 percent, **: 5 percent, ***: 1 percent.
We decompose the overall performance in the game into these diﬀer-
ent components and examine whether there is a correlation between these
decisions and attractiveness.
The first decision of players regards their initial capital and the level of
investment for the 10 regular questions. Table 4 shows OLS estimates for
the level of initial capital (regression (1)) and the share invested in each
round (regressions (2)-(4)). We find no clear correlation between these two
variables and attractiveness. The only variable aﬀecting the share invested
is age, with older players investing slightly less.
The second decision is whether to answer or not, given the share in-
vested. As we discussed earlier, since each question can only be answered
by one player at most, the decisions to answer are mutually exclusive: As
soon as one player has pushed the buzzer, the others cannot answer the
same question. We investigate whether some characteristics (such as attrac-
tiveness and gender) make a player more likely to be the one answering the
question or not. We estimate a conditional logit model, where the probabil-
ity of answering is defined as a function of the characteristics of the player
answering relative to the characteristics of the players competing with him.
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Then, we investigate whether these characteristics matter for the probability
of answering correctly, conditional on answering.
Table 5 - Probability of answering and correct answer (conditional on answering)
Odds ratios (Conditional logit estimates)
Round 1 Round 2 Round 3
Answer Correct Answer Correct Answer Correct
Cond.
logit
Logit
Cond.
logit
Logit
Cond.
logit
Logit
attractiveness .96 .90 .94 1.15 1.02 1.07
(.08) (.11) (.09) (.19) (.11) (.15)
female .70 1.12 .81 .67 .74 .88
(.07)*** (.40) (.09)* (.11)** (.09)** (.28)
age 1.00 .99 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.01
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01)* (.01)
share invested .65 1.03 1.10 1.33 .81 .79
(.14)** (.44) (.26) (.37) (.22) (.27)
pseudo R2 .006 .003 .003 .008 .005 .003
N. obs. 3450 580 2760 536 2070 484
Significance levels: *: 10 percent, **: 5 percent, ***: 1 percent.
Table 5 reports the results, and we find no systematic diﬀerence in be-
havior with respect to attractiveness. This is in contrast with the findings
of Mobius and Rosenblat (2006), who find, in an experimental setting, that
more attractive players are also more self-confident. If more attractive play-
ers were more confident, they should be more likely to answer and, con-
ditional on answering, perform worse. Here their probability of answering
seems even smaller, although the eﬀect is not significant. We do find a
systematic diﬀerence according to gender: Women are much less likely to
answer a question. This is what you would expect if women are more risk
averse or less confident. However, conditional on answering, they actually
do not perform better than men, what you would expect with risk aversion
or lack of confidence. In the second round, we even find that they are signif-
icantly less likely to answer correctly. Overall, these results suggest that the
reason why women are less likely to answer is not due to a wrong perception
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of their ability or a higher degree of risk aversion, but rather because they
are less able to answer the type of questions on the show.9
3.2.2 Behavior in the bonus questions
The last determinant of earnings is the bonus question at the end of each
round. Players decide on their investment before they see the question and
the player with the highest investment gets to answer the question. The
bonus questions are generally more subtle than the regular questions, and
are probably more diﬃcult. It is therefore not surprising that the success
rate in answering the bonus question is much lower than for the regular
questions, only slightly more than 50% are answered correctly, against more
than 75% for the regular questions.
Answering the bonus question has strong elements of team production.
In rounds 1 and 2, the capital for all players who progress to the next round,
t+1, is set equal to the earnings of the player with the greatest earnings in
round t. It is plausible to assume that a player with larger earnings is at least
as likely to answer correctly as a player with smaller earnings. This implies
that the expected starting capital for the next round is maximized if the
first player answers the question and invests all her earnings. In case of an
incorrect answers, the starting capital in the next round will then be equal to
the earnings of player 2. If players are relatively risk averse, player 2 should
always invest her entire capital and answer the question. Intuitively, if the
second player answers, this provides greater insurance since the earnings
of the first ranked player become the fall-back option. Irrespective of risk
preferences, from a team point of view, no lower ranked player should ever
answer.
In practice, players 1 and 2 often invest less than their entire earnings
and often one of the other players gets to answer the question. From a
team perspective this is ineﬃcient, resulting in an expected monetary loss
9 In this context, the finding of Gneezy et al. (2003) that women do less well than men
in a competitive environment, is relevant.
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Figure 2: Cumulative distributions of shares invested and earnings’ position
per round of around 15 percent of earnings — since earnings are eﬀectively
compounded across rounds, the overall losses are even larger.10 This can
be understood from an individual perspective. For instance, if the first
ranked player invests her entire earnings, she will end up last in the event of
an incorrect answer and becomes a prime candidate for elimination. Thus
investment decisions by first or second ranked players are likely to be risk-
averse, even though team production considerations would prescribe risk-
taking. Similarly, individuals who are low ranked may invest aggressively in
order to improve their ranking so possibly securing their own position in the
next round.11 Figure 2 confirms this. It shows the cumulative distribution
of shares invested for the first and last players, where we see that the latter
distribution first-order stochastic dominates that of the former.
Turning to the role of player preferences or psychological characteristics,
10We compute this (conservative) estimate as follows. If a player other than player 1
invests, then the benchmark eﬃcient investment level is one where where the second player
answers, and invests her entire capital — which corresponds to the risk averse choice. In
the case that player 1 invests, we compute the eﬃciency level relative to player 1 investing
all his capital. Compounding over rounds arises since lower earnings in any round reduces
investments and earnings in later rounds.
11This kind of ineﬃciency is similar to that arising in many organizations, where individ-
uals who are favorably placed for promotion are likely to advocate safe projects, whereas
dark-horses are inclined to lobby for more risky projects.
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we would expect low risk-averse and overconfident players to invest relatively
more in the bonus question, and be relatively less successful in answering.
Players with a higher ability should also be prepared to invest more. Table
6 reports the results for the share of earnings invested in the bonus ques-
tion, and the probability of answering correctly. We find that women invest
a relatively smaller share. On the other hand, attractiveness and age are
uncorrelated with the share invested. Turning to the probability of giving a
correct answer, we find no significant eﬀect of gender, age, attractiveness or
share invested. The results confirm our previous findings regarding attrac-
tiveness and gender. We find no evidence of a diﬀerence in self-confidence,
risk-aversion or true ability according to attractiveness. On the other hand,
women are less likely to answer both regular and bonus questions but do not
perform better conditional on answering, which means that the reason why
they invest less in the bonus question has probably more to do with ability
than with risk-aversion or lack of confidence.
Table 6 - Investment and performance in the bonus question
Share invested Correct answer
OLS estimates
Probit estimates
marginal eﬀects
(1) (2)
attractiveness .02 (.02) .01 (.05)
female -.06 (.02)*** .09 (.08)
age .00 (.00) .00 (.00)
earnings (x 1000) -.02 (.01)* -.01 (.03)
dummy lowest earnings .32 (.03)*** -.13 (.10)
round 2 -.12 (.02)*** .05 (.09)
round 3 -.05 (.03) .11 (.10)
constant .36 (.09)***
N 782 207
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by episode, pooled
sample including data from the three rounds. The share
invested is unavailable for players with zero earnings.
Significance levels: *: 10 percent, **: 5 percent, ***: 1 percent.
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3.3 Beauty and cooperativeness
Players can only materialize their gains in this game after a final stage,
where the two remaining players play a prisoner’s dilemma game and decide
simultaneously to share the accumulated money or not. A companion paper
(Belot et. al. (2006)) conducts a comprehensive analysis of the determinants
of sharing behavior. The key findings are that own characteristics matter —
specifically, women are more likely to share than men. However, the char-
acteristics of the opponent turn out to be irrelevant to the sharing decision.
We augment this analysis by including the player’s own beauty rating and
the opponent’s beauty rating as explanatory variables. The results are re-
ported in Table 7. We find no correlation between beauty and cooperative
behavior. Attractive players are no more (or less) likely to share — indeed,
the coeﬃcient is very close to 0.12 Attractive opponents are also no more
(or less) likely to induce sharing behavior from their opponents.
Table 7 - Attractiveness and probability of sharing
Probit estimates
(1) (2)
Own attractiveness -.01 (.07) -.04 (.06)
Opponent’s attractiveness - - .09 (.06)
Age .00 (.01) .00 (.01)
Female .16 (.10)* .18 (.10)*
Contribution to prize money (%) -.55 (.22)** -.58 (.23)**
Total gains (x 1,000) .04 (.01)** .04 (.01)***
N. obs. 138 138
Significance levels: *: 10 percent, **: 5 percent, ***: 1 percent.
It is possible that attractive people are perceived as being more cooper-
ative even though they are not really so.13 They may expect unattractive
12Our coeﬃcients are potentially biased if lead players use private signals to select
players. In that case, the sample of unattractive players may be unusually cooperative.
We address the selection bias in detail in the companion paper, and find no evidence of a
bias (see Belot et. al., 2006).
13There is some evidence in favor of such incorrect beliefs in trust experiments — see An-
dreoni and Petrie (2005) and Eckel and Wilson (2004). However, the evidence is somewhat
mixed and indirect.
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people to be less cooperative, and therefore disfavor them in the elimination
rounds. We do not observe the beliefs of participants on the show. However,
we showed a sample of games to independent subjects, asking them to pre-
dict the probability that the players would share. We find that observers do
not believe that attractive people are more cooperative — on the contrary,
they predict above average attractive people to be slightly less cooperative,
although this is not significant.
4 Beauty and selection
We now study the elimination / selection decision, having established that
there is no objective reason to discriminate in favor of attractive players
either on the grounds of performance or because they are more cooperative.
Thus any bias towards attractive players in lead player selection decisions
can plausibly be attributed to the lead players obtaining consumption value
from having attractive co-players.
An important advantage of the rules of our game show is that in mak-
ing the elimination decision, the lead player in any round is faced with a
relatively simple decision problem, rather than a game. If the lead player
chooses to eliminate player i then the lead player is decisive and i will play
no further part in the game. In contrast, elimination decisions in other game
shows (such as The Weakest Link, analyzed by Levitt (2004)) are often made
by majority voting, involving all the participants remaining at that stage.
Majority voting games are plagued by multiple equilibria, and this becomes
even more of a problem in a dynamic context. If a player j votes to eliminate
i, then i may not be eliminated, and may in turn vote against j at a later
stage. This implies that players have a strong incentive to vote to eliminate
whoever they think others are going to vote against. In others words, given
the presence of multiple equilibria in voting, and the strategic motive to vote
with the majority, this may induce a significant role for irrelevant character-
istics as possible focal points, even when players do not have any preference
16
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Figure 3: Average beauty per round of all players and eliminated players.
for discriminating on the basis of such a characteristic. In the context of
our game, these strategic considerations do not apply, since only the lead
player votes and his vote is decisive. Thus evidence of discrimination can
be attributed to lead player preferences.
Figure 3 illustrates the importance of beauty in the elimination decision.
It shows the average attractiveness of remaining players in rounds one to
three, and also plots the attractiveness of the two players in the final stage.
Average attractiveness increases steadily over rounds one to three, and the
most attractive player is the one who is chosen to be in the final, at the end
of round three. Other summary statistics confirm this picture. If a player
is average-looking (i.e. within one standard deviation of the mean), he or
she has 0.4 probability of reaching the final round. An attractive player has
a substantially higher probability of 0.51, while an unattractive player has
probability only 0.31 (see Table 8).
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Table 8 - Attractiveness and probability of playing by round
% reaching % reaching % reaching
round 2 round 3 final
Attractive 83 62 51
Average-looking 81 62 40
Unattractive 72 52 31
Note: Attractive (unattractive) is more than one standard
deviation above (below) the mean.
We investigate the role of physical attractiveness in the selection decision
by the lead player in more detail by estimating a conditional logit model,
where the dependent variable indicates whether the player was eliminated
(1) or not (0).
The results are shown in Table 9. Column (1) is a benchmark specifi-
cation controlling for age, gender, score ranking and the measure of attrac-
tiveness. The odds ratio corresponding to attractiveness is below unity and
significant at the 10% level. Thus, attractive players are significantly less
likely to be eliminated. In columns (2) and (3) we use dummies for the most
and least attractive player within an episode, excluding the player who is in
the position to eliminate. We find that the most attractive player is equally
likely to be eliminated as the average-looking players. The least attractive
player, on the other hand, is significantly more likely to be eliminated. The
eﬀect is substantial: The least attractive player is almost twice as likely to
be eliminated at the end of the first round than any other player. As we
will show, this result is stable over diﬀerent specifications. Note that age
and gender are irrelevant in the selection decision. Also, the score ranking
is a very good predictor of elimination: the player with the lowest score
(reference category) is more than twice as likely to be eliminated as the one
ranked fourth, and more than five times as likely to be eliminated as the
one with the second highest score. Finally, controls for behavior during the
game do not change the results and do not matter as such in the selection
decision (column (4)). Less attractive players are discriminated against, for
reasons that are uncorrelated with their performance or behavior during the
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game.
Table 9 - Probability of being eliminated at the end of the first round
Conditional logit estimates (odds ratios)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Attractiveness .66 (.16)*
Mean attractiveness (.23)
Most attractive 1.21 (.42)
Least attractive 1.91** (.51) 1.78 (.51)** 1.77 (.51)**
Performance
Fourth highest .42 (.13)*** .47** (.15) .47 (.15)** .48 (.16)**
Third highest .30 (.10)*** .35*** (.13) .34 (.12)*** .36 (.15)**
Second highest .18 (.08)*** .17*** (.08) .17 (.08)*** .19 (.10)***
% correct answers .77 (.39)
Behavioral
% capital invested .73 (.53)
number of answers .97 (.13)
Female .73 (.23) .71 (.22) .71 (.22) .71 (.22)
Age 1.00 (.02) 1.00 (.02) 1.00 (.02) 1.00 (.02)
N. obs. 276 276 276 276
Significance levels: *: 10 percent, **: 5 percent, ***: 1 percent.
4.1 Discrimination over rounds
One explanation for the discrimination taking place in the first round is that
players have very little information about each other. They had relatively
little time to get to know each other and to learn about each other’s ability.
With so little information, perhaps they retreat to attractiveness to select
one player over another.
If this is the reason, we expect discrimination to disappear over the
rounds when more information becomes available. Although there does not
seem to be a lot of discrimination going on in the second round, the dis-
crimination taking place in the third round is very similar to what happens
in the first round. The least attractive players are again very likely to be
eliminated with an odds ratio comparable to the coeﬃcient we find for the
first round (see Table 10).
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Table 10 - Probability of being eliminated in 3d round
Conditional logit estimates (odds ratios)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ranked last .32 (.10)*** .33 (.10)*** .33 (.10)*** .34*** (.10)
mean attractiveness .58 (.18)* .64 (.21) - - - -
least attractive player - - - - 1.89 (.57)** 1.76 (.55)*
age - 1.02 (.03) - - 1.03 (.03)
gender - 1.15 (.44) - - 1.14 (.45)
N 138 138 138 138
Significance levels: *: 10 percent, **: 5 percent, ***: 1 percent.
4.2 Heterogeneity in discriminatory behavior
We now explore the nature of discrimination greater detail. We first inves-
tigate the relationship between the "ugliness penalty" and performance in
the game. Is being less attractive particularly a disadvantage when having
performed less well? We ran a separate regression for the sample of players
who have the lowest earnings and compare these results to the remaining
sample. The results are striking: The player who has the lowest score but is
not the least attractive of that round, is about three times more likely to be
eliminated as the others. In shows where the player with the lowest score is
also the least attractive player, he or she is about 6.6 times as likely to be
eliminated as the other players.
Table 11 - Probability of being eliminated in first round
Conditional logit estimates - Odds ratios
(1) (2)
lowest score 2.96*** (.72) -
lowest score & player least attractive - 6.6 (3.56)***
N. obs. 276 64
Significance levels: *: 10 percent, **: 5 percent, ***: 1 percent.
We now investigate the relation between discrimination and gender. Do
men care more about looks than women do? Do people care more about
the looks of the opposite sex? Table 12 reports separate regressions for male
and female lead players. We find that women do discriminate more against
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the least attractive player than men do, i.e. women seem to care more about
looks than men do. The diﬀerence in coeﬃcients between male and female
lead players is not significant though. Columns (3) and (4) investigate the
elimination decision when the lead and least attractive player are of opposite
sex on the one hand, and of the same sex on the other hand. We find that
discrimination is indeed more present among players of opposite sex. The
diﬀerence in coeﬃcients is significant at the 10% level. Altogether, these
results seem to reinforce the idea that beauty has a consumption value, and
that this is the main reason why people discriminate against less attractive
players.
Table 12: Discrimination and beauty of the lead player (first round)
Conditional logit estimates (odds ratios)
Lead player
female
Lead player
male
Lead player
and least
attractive -
opposite sex
Lead player
and least
attractive -
same sex
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Fourth highest score .24 (.18)* .50 (.18)* .36 (.19)** .53 (.23)
Third highest score .24 (.19)* .39 (.16)** .50 (.24) .18 (.11)***
Second highest score .21 (.15)** .13 (.08)*** .29 (.15)** .05 (.05)***
Least attractive 4.55 (3.11)** 1.39 (.48) 2.75 (1.17)** 1.10 (.53)
Age .95 (.04) 1.01 (.02) .97 (.02) 1.03 (.03)
Gender .93 (.67) .70 (.24) .69 (.32) .56 (.27)
N. obs 84 192 140 136
Test equality coeﬃcients
for the least attractive
(1) = (2) P-value
(3) = (4) P value
.10 .16
Notes: Equality of coeﬃcients is tested with a generalized Hausman test
Significance levels: *: 10 percent, **: 5 percent, ***: 1 percent.
4.3 The price of beauty
The game show is such that the stakes are substantial. By eliminating
the least attractive players instead of players who would maximize their
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monetary payoﬀ, players implicitly pay a price for keeping more attractive
players in the game. We now do a back-of-the-envelope calculation of the
price that they are willing to pay to eliminate the least attractive player.
We can identify 13 cases where the lead player eliminates the least at-
tractive player in the third round, even though this player does not have the
lowest score. These players have average earnings of around 750, while the
players who are chosen instead have average earnings of only 400. Hence,
by eliminating the least attractive players in these cases, the lead player
diminishes the prize money E by 350 on average. This is likely to be a lower
bound because other unattractive players may already have been eliminated
in earlier rounds, who might otherwise have pushed up the score further.14
5 Concluding comments
Following the work of Hamermesh and Biddle (1994), who find a beauty
premium in the labor market in a variety of occupations, several papers have
attempted to disentangle its components. Biddle and Hamermesh (1998)
analyze a sample of lawyers, and find a premium irrespective of their area
of expertise and also including the self-employed. They argue that the most
plausible explanation is taste-based discrimination by clients. Mocam and
Tekin (2006) find that unattractive people sort into criminal activity due to
the existence of a beauty premium on the legal labor market.
One diﬃculty with most empirical studies is to disentangle attractiveness
from ability. There is often no precise measure of productivity, so it is
hard to establish whether the premium is due to productivity diﬀerences or
discrimination. Such productivity eﬀects are sometimes present. Landry et.
al. (2006) find that attractive female solicitors are more productive fund-
raisers, and Pfann et. al. (2000) find that companies with better looking
executives have higher revenues.
14 It might be that lead players expect those with a lower score to be more cooperative,
for which there is evidence (Belot et. al., 2006). But this doesn’t explain why the player
with a lower score is rarely chosen to play the final if he is is the least attractive player.
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The beauty premium is also replicated in experimental studies. Mobius
and Rosenblat (2006) present evidence showing that attractive people are
more confident, and this may increase an observer’s estimate of their ability.
In their setup “employers” have to estimate the productivity of workers
(i.e. the number of mazes they can solve). Most striking is their finding
that attractive people are estimated to have higher productivity even when
their interaction with the employer is only oral, not visual. They attribute
this to the self-confidence of attractive workers. We find no evidence that
beautiful people are more confident, since they answer the same number of
questions and invest the same amount of money. One key diﬀerence between
our set up and theirs is that individuals get repeated public feedback in the
performance phase, on their success in answering quiz questions. This might
prevent them from sustaining higher levels of self-confidence.
In relation to this literature, the novelty of our paper has been to use
data from a game show in order to shed light on the sources of the beauty
premium. The game show format has several advantages, insofar as it allows
us to disentangle the role of diﬀerent factors that could lead to the premium.
However, there are important caveats. People might behave diﬀerently on
national television, and may hesitate to discriminate, leading us to underes-
timate discrimination. On the other hand, the interaction time is relatively
short, and the participants are not well trained to select the best person.
Personnel managers might have more experience and discriminate less. A
translation of our results to the labor market should therefore be made with
caution.
Our research is also complementary to the studies by List (2006) and
Levitt (2004). They use game shows to study discrimination based on pub-
lic characteristics such as race, sex or age (they do not consider attractive-
ness). They find some evidence of taste-based discrimination against older
players. List (2004) studies the game show Friend or Foe?, which has a sim-
ilar final stage as Shafted but with diﬀerences in the selection stage. Most
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importantly, teams are formed prior to the trivia rounds so that players
are uninformed about the ability of their partners. This uncertainty about
performance makes it harder to isolate taste based discrimination from in-
correct perceptions on productivity. The Weakest Link, studied by Levitt
(2004), has the disadvantage of a complicated optimal strategy during the
trivia rounds. The strategic incentives change over the rounds: at first, it is
best to keep the best performing players in the game to increase the prize
money, but later on this switches because they will be the competitor in the
final. This is further complicated because elimination is via majority voting,
which implies that there are multiple equilibria.
Our findings can be related to experimental work on the relation between
attractiveness and behavior in prisoner’s dilemma type games. Mulford et
al. (1998)15 study a prisoner’s dilemma game where subjects have an out-
side option. Subjects are more likely to opt in and play more cooperatively
against opponents they regard as attractive. Andreoni and Petrie (2005)
study a public goods game, and find a beauty premium when contributions
are private, but this disappears in the treatment with publicly observable
contributions. They attribute this to subjects expecting more from attrac-
tive players. In the treatment with observable contributions, expectations
are not born out and others reduce their contributions accordingly, turning
the beauty premium into a beauty penalty. Eckel and Wilson (2004) study
a trust game and find that attractive players receive less, both in the role of
first mover (second movers return less) and in the role of second mover (first
movers send less). In an ultimatum game study, Solnick and Schweitzer
(1999) oﬀer more to attractive opponents, but also appear to demand more
from them as they more often reject oﬀers from attractive proposers. Over-
all, these experimental results are somewhat contradictory.
To return to the question posed by the title of this paper, we find that
beauty is indeed only skin-deep, and has no implications for a person’s
15 In an early contribution, Kahn et al. (1971) study a version of the repeated prisoner’s
dilemma game.
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performance or their cooperativeness. Nevertheless, it is an attribute well
worth having, even from a narrow monetary standpoint. Attractive players
earn a substantial premium, that arises from the reluctance of other players
to eliminate them. Since this positive selection is unrelated to performance,
it seems to reflect consumption value considerations on the part of the other
players in the game.
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6 Appendix
We use a conditional logit specification in three diﬀerent contexts: (1) Prob-
ability of being first or last, (2) Probability of answering a question, (3)
Probability of being eliminated. The conditional logit specification esti-
mates the probability that one alternative is chosen (realized) among a set
of possible alternatives, as a function of the attributes of the choices.
For example, suppose that the ‘ability’ of a player i, zi, can be written
as:
zi = βXi + ui
whereX is a vector of attributes such as attractiveness and u is a random
component. Suppose there are two players A and B. Player A answers a
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particular question if zA > zB. The probability that player A answers the
question is equal to:
P (zA > zB) = P (βXA + uA > βXB + uB)
= P (uA − uB > βXB − βXA)
McFadden (1974) showed that uA − uB follows a logistic distribution if
the individual errors uA, uB are independent and follow a type 1 Extreme
Value distribution.16
One important assumption is that the error terms are independent across
alternatives. This implies that the odds ratio of choosing alternative j over
alternative k does not depend on the other alternatives available. This is the
well-known Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) assumption. This
assumption is likely to be violated if there exists an alternative C that is a
closer substitutes to A than to B. In this case, the odds ratio of A versus
B will increase if C is eliminated from the choice set. This assumption
may be even more problematic in the context of the lead player’s choice
of which player is to be eliminated — if we model this as the lead player
choosing the subset of continuing players that has greatest value to her, then
complementarities across player types could arise, leading to a violation of
IIA.
Testing for the independence of irrelevant alternatives
We test for the validity of the IIA assumption as follows. Since the choice
set varies across episodes, we need to label the alternatives in a meaningful
way to test the IIA assumption. Since our main coeﬃcient of interest regards
attractiveness, we labeled the alternatives according to their attractiveness
ranking. We then excluded each alternative at a time and tested (with a
Hausman test) the stability of coeﬃcients across specifications.17 The results
16This distributional assumption conveniently links the random utility model to the
logistic model.
17We experimented with diﬀerent ways of labeling and found very similar results (the
IIA assumption is generally not rejected)
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are reported are reported in Tables A1-A3.18 Overall, the IIA assumption
is not rejected at the 5% level. Even in the cases where the p-value is small
(between 5 and 15%), the exclusion of an alternative never aﬀected the
conclusion regarding the attractiveness coeﬃcient: Attractiveness remained
not significant and the odds ratio remained close to 1 in all specifications.
Table A1 - Probability of being first or last in first round
Hausman test - P-value equality of coeﬃcients
Alternative excluded First Last
playeri = 1 .63 .98
playeri = 2 .93 .23
playeri = 3 .59 .33
playeri = 4 .13 .97
playeri = 5 .56 .051
Table A2 -Probability of answering in first round
Hausman test - P-value equality of coeﬃcients
Alternative excluded First Second Third
playeri = 1 .29 .12 .98
playeri = 2 .77 .11 .11
playeri = 3 .34 .06 .11
playeri = 4 .11 .27
playeri = 5 .25
Table A3 -Probability of being eliminated in first round
Alternative excluded Hausman test - P-value equality of coeﬃcients
playeri = 1 1.00
playeri = 2 .67
playeri = 3 .94
playeri = 4 .32
18Note that the IIA assumption is not invoked in the selection decision in the third
round as there are only two alternatives left.
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